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Abstract 
The impact of social networks on features of embedded couples, like, for instance, marital 
stability, has been discussed in sociology for about half a century. However, empirical 
findings are little cumulative and lack a theoretical integration. We present a framework for 
the analysis of couples, where their social embeddedness is conceptualized as social capital. 
Two aspects or dimensions of social capital are distinguished. On the one hand social capital 
can be seen as a property of a collective system of actors, which makes it a collective good, 
causing positive external effects (system capital). On the other hand it can be regarded as the 
pool of valuable resources or services controlled by others, that can be mobilized via social 
relations (relational capital). These two dimensions are roughly corresponding to the distinct 
views of social capital in literature. In our judgment, both aspects of social capital are 
important for marital stability. System capital facilitates co-operation between the spouses and 
hence fosters risky specific investments as an important precondition for a successful 
relationship. Relational capital, insofar as it is marital-specific, rises the costs of exiting the 
relationship, as it will lose its value if a disruption occurs. 
Structural factors that are assumed to constitute system capital are the closeness and 
homogeneity of networks, where orientations are shared and social control can be exercised. 
However, closeness has been captured in different ways: as personal network density, as joint 
network density or as network overlap, respectively. As a matter of fact these are analytically 
distinct concepts, though. The spouses individual networks can be dense due to high joint 
network density or clustering. For matters of empirical clarification, these concepts should be 
measured simultaneously. Moreover, a stabilizing effect of network overlap is theoretically 
ambiguous. It can as well be seen as an indicator for the marital-specificity of existing 
relational capital. As the marriage disrupts, formerly common friends might discontinue the 
relationship to one or both partners. 
We use event-history data on divorce (N=5020) to investigate the effect of closed networks on 
marital stability and test the assumption, that the overlap effect on marital stability is merely 
an effect of marital-specific relational capital. Non-specific relational capital, in contrast, is 
hypothesized to promote marital disruption. Further implications for the measurement of 
couples’ social capital and the data required are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Individuals are always embedded in a social context. Analyzing the consequences of different 
forms and arrangements of social relations, structural and normative features, has a long 
tradition in sociology. A classic example is Durkheim’s work on suicide (Durkheim, 1963). 
More recent work deals with the connection of social embeddedness and well-being (Acock & 
Hurlbert, 1993), the acquisition of human capital (Coleman, 2000), social and economical 
status (De Graaf & Flap, 1988; Lin, 1999), or job access (Granovetter, 1982), for example. 
Furthermore, there are several studies dealing with the impact of social embeddedness on 
features of intimate relationships like, for instance, stability, which is also the concern of this 
paper. One basic empirical result of this body of work is that a high overlap of the partners’ 
networks promotes the stability of the relationship (cf. Lee, 1979). Ackerman (1963) 
identifies a positive correlation between overlap and marital stability on the basis of 
anthropological findings. An additional effect of homogamy is put down to (unobserved) 
homogeneity in the networks. Komarovsky (1967) found that a joint network of friends 
strengthens marital solidarity. The most important reason for that, according to her, is the 
labeling of the couple as a unit and hence the strengthening of a joint identity. Following 
Milardo’s (1982) findings, an unmarried couple’s level of involvement is positively correlated 
to network overlap. And Booth, Edwards and Johnson (1991) find in a more recent study, that 
the percentage of shared friends leads to greater marital stability. In accordance with 
Komarovsky’s surmise, there are other analyses investigating the effect of network consent to 
the relationship (Lewis, 1973; Parks, Stan & Eggert, 1983; Felmlee, Sprecher & Bassin, 1990; 
Cox, Wexler & Rusbult, 1997). All show a stabilizing effect of a positive social reaction 
towards the couple. In addition to research on overlap, there is little work on network density. 
Already White (1957) reports that dense networks (of neighbors) foster marital stability. The 
reason why that should be the case is normative pressure. This reflects on Coleman’s (2000) 
reasoning, that close networks are a precondition for norms and effective sanctioning. 
Overall, the empirical literature confirms a positive overlap effect on marital stability. Yet, 
assumed theoretical mechanisms are not explicitly tested. The same is true for the density 
effect. Hence, measures of structural network features can only be seen as proxy variables for 
the actual theoretical concept: homogeneous normative pressure and labeling processes. 
Moreover, there is a competing hypothesis. Networks are important for individuals, as well as 
for couples, because they provide access to various kinds of resources and services, be they 
material, social or emotional (cf. Milardo 1988). If the network members of the partners are 
shared (i.e. the overlap is high), either of them is risking to lose at least some of them – and 
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hence the support associated with these relations – following a breakup of the partnership or 
marriage. Network overlap thus rises the exit costs from a relationship and for this reason 
should promote marital stability. 
From this perspective, a stabilizing overlap effect is not an explanation for differential marital 
stability, but merely a new explanandum. Controlling for adequate measures of the theoretical 
concepts should then reduce the effects of the structural network features. We present a 
theoretical framework where social embeddedness is conceptualized as social capital, deriving 
hypotheses how differential acquisitions with social capital influence marital stability. We 
then link the concepts with the structural measures and test for the hypothesis, that the overlap 
effect is (partially) a mere effect of specific social capital. 
Theoretical Framework 
Referring to social capital as “networks together with shared norms, values and 
understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups” (Cote & Healy, 2001: 
41), it seems natural to conceptualize the social embededdness of a couple as social capital. 
We distinguish two types of social capital which we term relational capital and system capital 
referring to distinct views of the concept in literature (Esser, 2000). By relational capital we 
mean the pool of valuable resources or services controlled by others, that can be mobilized via 
social relations. This general position is similar to the conceptions of social capital by 
Bourdieu (1983), Burt (1992), Lin (2001) and Flap (2002). It can be acquired and maintained 
through investments in relationships with others with the goal to assure the mobilization in 
case of need. The expected returns of relational capital are contingent on one’s position in the 
network, one’s trustworthiness and other’s obligations. Although relational capital is inherent 
in relations, it can be treated as a quasi-individual resource. If so, the same arguments 
applying to other forms of capital are valid for relational capital as well. Extending Becker’s 
argument on the impact of marital-specific capital on marital stability (Becker, Landes & 
Micheal, 1976; Becker 1981), relational capital should have a stabilizing effect, if it is 
marital-specific, i.e. if it loses (some of) its value in case of marital disruption. Relational 
capital mobilized via relations that are shared by the spouses should be of such quality, as the 
existence or strength of such relations or the trust met with should decrease at least for one of 
the spouses. This consequence follows from a restricted time budget, as well as from Balance 
Theory (Heider, 1958). In contrast, relational capital that is not marital-specific, i.e. results 
from exclusive relationships, can be transferred to single-hood and eventually used for 
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purposes of coping. Furthermore, it lessens the exit cost from marriage, as resource transfers 
from the partner can at least partially be compensated for by the network. 
By system capital we mean a property of a collective system of actors, like social control, 
trust in the whole system and all-embracing morals. This view is similar to the conceptions of 
Coleman (2000) and Putnam (1993, 1995). System capital can be seen as a collective good 
that cannot be invested in intentionally. The capital aspect of system capital is that it causes 
positive external effects. Regarding couples, system capital facilitates co-operation between 
the partners and hence fosters risky specific investments as an important precondition for a 
successful relationship. The structural basis for system capital is a dense, closed, stable 
network as a precondition to system control. If in such a network there are shared moral 
standards towards family behavior, deviation can be observed and sanctioned. Besides, social 
influence is exercised in dense networks and orientations are interactively mediated. These 
orientations – especially those related to the couple as a unit – might act as a frame for family-
oriented action. If the couple is labeled as a good match everything is fine and none of the 
spouses questions this. 
The effects of network structure on marital stability can now be linked to our theoretical 
concepts. 
Overlap should promote marital stability because: 
(a) in overlapping networks relational capital is rather marital-specific and  
(b)  overlapping networks tend to be more homogeneous and labeling processes should be 
more consistent, thus providing system capital.  
Network density or closeness should also promote marital stability because: 
(c) dense networks tend to be more homogeneous and labeling processes should be more 
consistent thus providing system capital. 
The possible effects of clustered networks are ambiguous. High clustering of networks here 
means that the spouses have dens separate networks, i.e. overlap and closeness are low.  
As clustered networks are not overlapping, 
(d) clustered networks (as compared to overlapping networks) should promote marital 
instability as they lack marital-specific relational capital. 
As clustered networks mean dense networks for each of the spouses, 
(e) clustered networks (as compared to low-density networks) provide system capital if 
both clusters share the same values and should then promote marital stability. 
(f) Otherwise clustered networks (as compared to low-density networks) should rather 
promote marital instability. 
 4
If the effects of social embeddedness on marital stability are in fact effects of social capital, 
the following hypotheses should hold: 
 
1. The risk of divorce varies negatively with the overlap between the partners’ networks. 
2. The risk of divorce varies negatively with the closeness of the joint network. 
3. The risk of divorce varies negatively with the amount of marital-specific relational 
capital. 
4. The risk of divorce varies positively with the amount of individual relational capital. 
5. The overlap effect decreases when controlling for relational capital. 
6. The risk of divorce varies negatively with the amount of system capital. 
7. The overlap effect decreases when controlling for system capital. 
8. The closeness effect decreases when controlling for system capital. 
Data and Method 
The “Mannheim Divorce Study” is a cross-sectional study of a disproportionally stratified 
sample of the (previously) married German population. 5020 Interviews were realized during 
the first half of 1996. Due to the stratification, about one half of the sample has been divorced 
with respect to their first marriage (n=2516) and the other half (n=2504) is still married or 
widowed. Design weights for the sub-samples were computed on the basis of previous 
screening interviews. The study was designed to analyze determinants of divorce in Germany 
with a rather large number of observations. One aim was to avoid lack of information by 
considering different theoretical approaches. Nevertheless, as a consequence of financial and 
practical restrictions, important measures have been captured retrospectively and partially 
through proxy-interviews. With respect to the social embeddedness of the respondents, 
network data is only available for parents and best friends of either spouse. Relations were not 
measured as time-varying variables and partners and network members were not interviewed. 
Despite this disadvantages the “Mannheim Divorce Study” is the only dataset for Germany 
that is suitable for the analysis of divorce rates and as well allows to compute network density 
and overlap, though only for the core networks of parents and best friends. 
Central Measures 
Our central measures for the analyses include measures for both marital-specific and 
individual relational capital and measures for different structural features of the network. 
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Marital-specific relational capital is measured as the amount of help (by channel) that the 
spouses can mobilize via shared friends or via parents with a better connection to their 
children in law than to their own. The reason for this is the assumption that ascribed family 
relations tend to be stable even after marital disruption, but that parents, who believed the best 
about their child was their spouse could withhold support after a divorce. The variable varies 
between 0 and 4. It is minimal if either none of the spouses can mobilize any help or all 
potential help comes from exclusive friends or parents. It is maximal if both spouses receive 
help from friends and family and all relations are shared. 
Individual relational capital is measured separately for husbands and wives. It captures the 
amount of help that is mobilized via exclusive relations. It is minimal if the spouse cannot 
mobilize any help or all help is marital-specific. It is maximal if the spouse receives help from 
friends and family and all relations are exclusive. 
Overlap is measured straightforward as share of common network relations. 
Density is measured straightforward as number of realized relations per number of possible 
relations between all network members excluding the two spouses. 
Alternatively, a measure of overall closeness is included, only considering the realization of 
relations between the individual networks (i.e. is there a relation between the husband’s best 
friend and the wife’s mother, e.g.). 
Additionally, the densities of the individual networks of husbands and wives were considered, 
serving as a measure of clustering.  
Other Variables 
A number of other variables were included in the analyses. A global measure for the existence 
of common friends (in addition to the computed overlap measure) as well as a variable for 
joint social participation was included in some analyses. Furthermore a rough measure for 
social prescription was included, indicating whether or not there was any interference from 
the network. In addition to this set of variables, a list of variables common in the study of 
divorce was also included, although not displayed here. Those variables include marriage 
cohort, duration of knowing before regularly dating, duration of relationship until 
cohabitation, duration of cohabitation until marriage, previous divorce of partner, existence of 
a marriage-contract, religiosity, educational homogamy, time spent in labor market (husband), 
time spent in labor market (wife), birth of first (second, third) child, real property, degree of 
urbanization, differences in marriage market opportunities and the rating of their sex life 
(husband and wife). Besides, measures were included to control for possible artifacts due to 
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the coding of the density measures. Cases with a network size ≤ 1 were coded 0 on density 
measures instead of being dropped, since a calculation of a fraction is impossible here. To 
control for this artifacts, dummies where included. 
Analytical Strategy 
We use conditional proportional hazard regression models for left-truncated data to test our 
hypotheses on the determinants of marital dissolution. Due to restrictions of the data at hand, 
we test only the first five of the hypotheses presented above. Episode time is measured as 
duration between the starting time of the relationship and the date of divorce, or censoring 
(death of spouse for widows, date of interview for married respondents), respectively. Yet, 
respondents enter the population at risk at time of marriage. Coefficients reported are 
proportional effects on the hazard rate. 
Results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the central variables. Note that the structural 
measures can take any value between 0 and 1, whereas the capital measures only contain 
integers. For the calculation of density measure statistics, cases where density was not 
computable were omitted. 
 
TABLE 1:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CENTRAL MEASURES 
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. 
overlap .70 .32 0 1 
density .58 .29 0 1 
closeness .40 .38 0 1 
density (m) .80 .35 0 1 
density (f) 80 .35 0 1 
m.s.r.c. 1.31 .97 0 4 
i.r.c. (m) .73 .64 0 2 
i.r.c (f) .85 .64 0 2 
Note: Abbreviations are m.s.r.c. for marital specific relational capital, i.r.c (m) for 
 husbands’ individual relational capital and i.r.c. (f) for wives’ individual re-
 lational capital.  
 
Table 2 presents the results of a series of proportional hazard models including standard 
variables (not shown) and structural measures. Model 1 shows the overlap effect on the risk of 
divorce, if no other structural measures are included. Overlap significantly reduces the risk of 
breakup by 84 %. In other words, couples with exclusive networks face more than six times 
the risk of divorce compared to couples with completely overlapping networks. Model 2 
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shows the effect of joint network density, which also significantly reduces the divorce risk. 
The densities of the individual networks, as can be seen in Model 3, have no significant 
influence on the divorce risk. Models 4 and 5 include all structural measures. When 
controlling for density, the overlap effect holds, whereas the effect of joint network density 
disappears, when measures for personal network density are included. For this reason, the 
overall density measure is replaced by a measure of overall network closeness in the 
following models. This allows interpreting individual network densities as measures of 
clustering. In contrast to the density effect, the closeness effect is still significant in Model 5. 
Hypotheses one and two can thus be confirmed with our data. The destabilizing effects of 
personal networks (only significant for husbands’ networks) might be interpreted in two 
different ways. Either dense personal networks are a source of individual relational capital or 
for individuals in our sample, clustered networks is associated with heterogeneous 
orientations. 
 
TABLE 2:  COEFFICIENTS FROM COX REGRESSION MODELS OF MARITAL DISSOLUTION:  
 STRUCTURAL MEASURES 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
overlap 
 
.16*** 
(-18.01) 
   
.14*** 
(-15.65) 
 
.16*** 
(-13.79) 
 
density 
  
.32*** 
(-9.76) 
  
.80 
(-1.25) 
 
 
 
closeness 
    
 
 
.67*** 
(-3.45) 
 
density (m) 
   
1.11 
(.95) 
 
1.36* 
(2.38) 
 
1.34* 
(2.55) 
 
density (f) 
   
.87 
(-1.27) 
 
1.20 
(1.39) 
 
1.16 
(1.34) 
N 20806 20806 20806 20806 20806 
Note:  Numbers in parantheses are z values, not standard errors. 
 N gives the total number of splits. 
 ***p≤.001; **p≤.01; *p≤.05 
 
Table 3 presents the results of a series of models that include our social capital measures. 
Model 1 replicates the last model from table 2. Model 2 includes additional global measures 
for shared networks: the existence of common friends and the joint participation in 
organizational activities. Although the overlap effect slightly reduces, there is no substantial 
shift in the pattern of influence of the structural measures. Model 3 includes a simple measure 
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of the amount of help that the couple can mobilize from the network. The variable has no 
effect on the divorce risk, nor any impact on the overlap effect. This finding is not surprising, 
as the sheer existence of help does not specify, whether this help is specific or not. Model 4 
instead includes our measures for relational capital. The obtained effects are as predicted. 
Marital-specific relational capital reduces the risk of divorce, whereas individual relational 
capital for husband or wife raises the risk. Moreover, the overlap effect reduces significantly 
to half of its strength, though the remaining effect is still rather large. Thus, hypotheses three 
to five can be confirmed. The results in model 4 also somewhat support our speculation that 
the destabilizing effect of clustering might be due to individual relational capital. 
Unfortunately we are not able to build an adequate measure for system capital with our data. 
But models 6 and 7 control for a proxy for labeling behaviour that should be related to the 
theoretical construct. The variable has a significant impact on marital stability reducing the 
risk of divorce by 40 %. Yet overlap and closeness remain unaltered. 
 
TABLE 3: COEFFICIENTS FROM COX REGRESSION MODELS OF MARITAL DISSOLUTION:  
 CONTROLLING SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
overlap 
 
.16*** 
(-13.79) 
 
.20*** 
(-10.99) 
 
.20*** 
(-10.67) 
 
.40*** 
(-5.45) 
 
.23*** 
(-9.98) 
 
.43*** 
(-4.84) 
 
closeness 
 
.67*** 
(-3.45) 
 
.66*** 
(-3.53) 
 
.65*** 
(-3.53) 
 
.64*** 
(-3.76) 
 
.69*** 
(-3.23) 
 
.66*** 
(-3.46) 
 
density (m) 
 
1.34* 
(2.55) 
 
1.32* 
(2.40) 
 
1.33* 
(2.37) 
 
1.10 
(.77) 
 
1.21 
(1.72) 
 
.99 
(-.07) 
 
density (f) 
 
1.16 
(1.34) 
 
1.17 
(1.38) 
 
1.22 
(1.74) 
 
1.10 
(.85) 
 
1.24 
(1.85) 
 
1.17 
(1.35) 
 
help 
   
1.05 
(1.36) 
   
 
m.s.r.c. 
    
.80*** 
(-4.82) 
  
.82*** 
(-4.07) 
 
i.r.c. (m) 
    
1.14* 
(2.21) 
  
1.16* 
(2.53) 
 
i.r.c (f) 
    
1.41*** 
(5.25) 
  
1.43*** 
(5.40) 
 
labeling 
     
.59*** 
(-6.81) 
 
.58*** 
(6.82) 
N 20806 20770 19837 19837 20770 19837 
 ***p≤.001; **p≤.01; *p≤.05 
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Finally, table 4 presents the results of competing risk models where the events are divorces 
either initiated by husband, wife, or both. Model 1 contains only the structural measures, 
whereas model two includes relational capital and labeling. Our hypotheses are also 
confirmed by these analyses, with the one exception that there is no significant closeness 
effect for husbands. Furthermore, as one might have expected, individual relational capital 
only raises the risk of divorce initiated by the one possessing it. 
 
TABLE 4:  COEFFICIENTS FROM COX REGRESSION MODELS OF MARITAL DISSOLUTION:  
 COMPETING RISKS OF INITIATIVE TO DIVORCE 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Variable Husband Wife Both  Husband Wife Both 
 
overlap 
 
.11*** 
(-14.54) 
 
.29*** 
(-12.59) 
 
.27*** 
(-9.12) 
  
.21*** 
(-8.80) 
 
.64*** 
(-3.81) 
 
.40*** 
(-5.92) 
 
closeness 
 
.89 
(-1.00) 
 
.55*** 
(-7.03) 
 
.70*** 
(-3.76) 
  
.86 
(-1.21) 
 
.50*** 
(-8.46) 
 
.67*** 
(-3.98) 
 
density 
(m) 
 
.55*** 
(-3.83) 
 
1.62*** 
(5.95) 
 
1.55*** 
(3.69 
  
.56*** 
(-5.11) 
 
1.22* 
(2.43) 
 
1.70*** 
(3.82) 
 
density (f) 
 
1.03 
(.16) 
 
.87 
(-1.71) 
 
1.46*** 
(3.39) 
  
1.24 
(1.69) 
 
.95 
(.69) 
 
1.36* 
(2.48) 
 
m.s.r.c. 
 
 
    
.67*** 
(-8.71) 
 
.71*** 
(-9.87) 
 
.96 
(-.93) 
 
i.r.c. (m) 
     
1.24*** 
(3.77) 
 
1.06 
(1.35) 
 
1.48*** 
(5.27) 
 
i.r.c (f) 
     
1.02 
(.26) 
 
1.48*** 
(9.11) 
 
1.01 
(.14) 
 
labeling 
     
.69*** 
(-4.64) 
 
.59*** 
(-9.55) 
 
.68*** 
(-4.34) 
N  20770    19837  
 ***p≤.001; **p≤.01; *p≤.05 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
Our analyses show the predicted effect of relational capital on marital stability, as well as a 
reduction of the overlap effect when controlling for it, thus confirming our main hypotheses. 
However, even after controlling, a rather large overlap effect remains. There are three 
explanations for this result. At first, as suggested by our theoretical framework, an effect 
remains due to the system capital that should be related to overlapping networks, as stated 
above. In this case, controlling for an adequate measure of system capital should further lower 
the overlap effect to an insignificant level. Secondly, the relation between relational capital 
and overlap is possibly underestimated due to the construction of the variables on the basis of 
data that is restricted in this respect. For example, overlap is calculated only on the basis of a 
very small network consisting of parents and best friends of the two spouses, whereas 
information on support is only available as linked to either friends or relatives as a whole. 
Furthermore, we have no information on the kinds of support and their evaluation by the 
spouses and we have also no information on different tie strengths, trust or obligations. In this 
case, better data allowing to construct variables more closely linked to theory should improve 
the results. Finally, there is the possibility that structural features of networks reflect other 
effects that cannot be linked to social capital. In this case there should be a residual effect 
even after controlling for adequate measures of both, relational capital and system capital. 
Anyway, to further test our theory, better data is required. This primarily includes the use of 
longitudinal data to rule out the possibility, that not network structure or social capital have an 
impact on marital stability, but that retrospectively gathered information on networks, support 
and orientations is biased, depending on whether the respondent is still happily married or 
divorced. 
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